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1. Introduction 
Scholars across a variety of disciplines have come to believe that eighteenth-century luminaries 
such as David Hume and Adam Smith were correct to see our normative judgments as 
sentiments—that is, as integrating both affective and cognitive elements, both emotions and 
beliefs.  
There are several ways to defend this thesis (Frazer 2013: 21-24). Psychologists, neuroscientists 
and other social scientists have gathered considerable evidence that normative judgments depend 
on emotions (e.g. Damasio 1994; Marcus et al. 2000; Haidt 2001; Westen 2007). Philosophers 
have explored the deeper implications of these empirical discoveries (e.g. Nichols 2004; Prinz 
2007). Ethicists and political theorists argue that emotional engagement ought to be appreciated 
as positive features of our ethical and political lives (e.g. Walzer 2004; Hall 2005; Krause 2008; 
Frazer 2010; Slote 2010). During the first half of the twentieth century, analytic metaethicists 
even argued that the very concept of affectless evaluation is incoherent (Ayer 1936: 102-119; 
Stevenson 1944). Under a particularly strong version of this metaethical view—often defended 
under such names as emotivism, non-cognitivism, or expressivism—moral judgments consist 
only of emotion, and contain no cognitive content, whatsoever. Among metaethicists today, 
moderate, qualified, hybrid, or ‘neosentimentalist’ views are more popular (e.g. Gibbard 1990; 
D’Arms and Jacobson 2000). 
Given the long-standing centrality of emotion in analytic metaethics, it is surprising that 
sentimentalism is only now gaining a foothold in Anglo-American political theory. Some might 
see this as evidence of the irrelevance of metaethics to politics. Even though the view that 
metaethics is normatively neutral has not been popular for nearly half a century (Gewirth 1968; 
Gewirth 1970; Solomon 1970), the view that political theory ought to be metaethically neutral is 
still widespread. Following Rawls (1996: 12-15), metaethics is often classified alongside 
religion, metaphysics and even comprehensive theories of normative ethics as an inappropriate 
starting-point for political theorizing in a democratic society characterized by a broad diversity 
of competing worldviews. 
Yet although there may be good reasons to try to build our political theories on as non-
controversial a philosophical foundation as possible, our views about the necessary or proper 
form of normative judgements will inevitably shape the techniques we use to try to form better 
ones. The main implications of methaethics for political theory are thus likely to be 
methodological rather than substantive. Most important for our present purposes, the standard 
tools of analytic political theory discussed elsewhere in this volume, which are designed to help 
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us formulate sound and valid arguments rather than to hone our emotional sensitivity, typically 
fail to speak to our sentiments. 
The tension between the aspiration to make the standard methods of analytic political theory 
metaethically neutral and the likelihood that their appeal depends on some form of moral 
cognitivism can be felt throughout the present volume. In the chapter on thought experiments, for 
example, Brownlee and Stemplowska argue that ‘what matters in thought experiments are not (or 
not exclusively) raw affective states.’ Despite appearances to the contrary, they claim that this 
view is compatible with a ‘sophisticated version of non-cognitivism’, one which ‘accepts that, 
even if moral judgment is ultimately a matter of affective states, there is nonetheless a plausible 
distinction to be drawn between raw affective states and “gardened” or reflective ones’ (p. xx). 
Indeed, sentimentalists have rarely thought that one ought to follow one’s immediate moral 
feelings, but instead must undertake a process of reflective correction in which all one’s moral 
sentiments are progressively put under the test of their own evaluative scrutiny (Frazer 2010).  
Later in their chapter, however, Brownlee and Stemplowska defend the permissibility of what 
they call ‘imaginatively opaque’ thought experiments—scenarios in which it is impossible to 
engage empathetically with the impossible situations in which the protagonists find 
themselves—on the grounds that ‘experiments are not “run” (simply) to establish how we (the 
experimenters) would feel, but to establish what we may plausibly think’ (p. XX). Purely 
cognitive consideration of characters with whom empathy is impossible may allow for the 
formation of proper normative judgments if evaluation is a matter of pure reason, but this 
imaginative opacity will prevent proper judgement under most sentimentalist theories. 
If the standard methods of analytic normative theory are indeed less attractive under a 
sentimentalist theory than they are under a cognitivist one, then the committed sentimentalist is 
left with at least three options. Most emotivists in the first half of the twentieth century believed 
that only analytic methods qualified as philosophical. Since analytic techniques could never 
vindicate normative claims, normative evaluation could not be a legitimate part of philosophy. 
Of course, considerations of professional survival make this option rather unattractive to 
normative theorists. Fortunately for us, in the second half of the twentieth century normative 
moral and political philosophy came to establish themselves as important subfields in even the 
most analytic philosophy departments.  
Second, the standard techniques of analytic normative theory could be reinterpreted in ways that 
make them a better fit with sentimentalism. Even if most analytic philosophers believe that they 
are only in the business of constructing sound and valid arguments, they may succeed in 
improving their readers’ normative judgments by encouraging psychologically holistic self-
scrutiny, sparking empathy with other’s emotional experiences, and increasing sensitivity to the 
affectively salient features of collective life. I have argued elsewhere that Rawls (1999) succeeds 
in engaging our moral sentiments in exactly these ways, and that his theory of justice is far more 
sentimentalist than Rawls himself ever acknowledges (Frazer 2007). Many of the most 
successful pieces of moral and political philosophy operate similarly; just think of the emotional 
power of Singer (1972) equating a nearby child drowning in a mud puddle with one dying from 
famine in Bangladesh. Yet since most affective effects of analytic philosophy are unintended by-
products of its usual methods, this alternative is unsuited for a chapter designed to provide a 
guide to the intentional practice of sentimentalist theory. 
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Only sentimentalists who are willing to violate the conventions of contemporary philosophy will 
deliberately seek to evoke moral sentiments in their readers. As such, my focus here will be on a 
third alternative available to sentimentalists, who can make common cause with all those seeking 
to bring a greater diversity of methods and approaches to the practice of Anglo-American 
political theory.  
Once we accept that political theory can be more than a matter of applied logic, we can 
consciously develop techniques designed to spark psychologically holistic reflection in our 
readers. Section 2 of this chapter will discuss the implications that sentimentalism should and 
should not have for our approach to normative political theory. Section 3 defends the 
permissibility of this theoretical approach against possible objections. Section 4 concludes by 
drawing on the work of Hume and Smith to provide concrete advice about how to apply 
sentimentalist techniques successfully. 
 
2. Sentimentalist Theory and Impassioned Practice 
This is hardly the place to provide a full defense of sentimentalism on empirical, normative or 
conceptual grounds. Instead, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that sentimentalism in some 
form is true, or at least more plausible than the available alternatives. The obvious 
methodological response would seem to be an impassioned form of normative argumentation. 
Nussbaum, for one, suggests that conducting sentimentalist theory dispassionately gives the 
appearance of a ‘peculiar sort of self-contradiction between form and thesis.’ Consider, she 
suggests, an article that 
argues that the emotions are essential and central in our efforts to gain understanding on 
any important ethical matter; and yet it is written in a style that expresses only intellectual 
activity and strongly suggests that only this activity matters for the reader in his or her 
attempts to understand. There might have been some interesting reason for writing this 
way; but usually, in cases of this kind, the whole issue had just not arisen. Such articles 
were written as they were because that was the way philosophy was being written, and 
sometimes because an emotive or literary style would have evoked criticism, or even 
ridicule (Nussbaum 1990: 21). 
 
Nussbaum’s argument would seem to suggest that there is at least a pro tanto reason for those 
convinced of the truth of moral sentimentalism to adopt different approaches to philosophical 
argumentation than those adopted by their cognitivist colleagues, one stemming from the desire 
to avoid contradiction between form and content. In order to avoid such contradictions, it can be 
argued that diverse philosophical positions require different investigative methods and modes of 
expression (Stewart 2013: 1-12, 159-170). 
 
In fact, however, there is neither any logical entailment nor a strong empirical correlation 
between a commitment to moral sentimentalism and the adoption of a distinctively impassioned 
approach. Sentimentalists often draw a distinction between the proper practice of philosophy and 
the proper practice of everyday reflection, maintaining that it is not appropriate for philosophers 
to express or evoke moral sentiments, but only to discover the truth about them. As a result, one 
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might argue that while first-order practical reflection is and ought to be impassioned, second-
order philosophical investigation into the nature of this first-order reflection should not be.  
 
There is considerable precedent for this sort of unemotional analysis of human emotion. While 
ancient philosophers may have disagreed about the proper place of passion in moral life, most 
agreed that the study of emotion was an important part of the philosophical enterprise, such as in 
the fields of rhetoric and poetics. Yet Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics are as dry as anything else 
in his corpus. Aristotle carefully examines the evocation of human emotion while failing to 
evoke any significant feelings in the reader (with the possible exception, depending on one’s 
predilections, of intellectual excitement or boredom). The same dispassion can be found in the 
study of emotion by most experimental psychologists and sentimentalist metaethicists today. 
Hume is therefore guilty of no inconsistency when he insists in the Treatise that, when it comes 
to practical decision-making, ‘reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions’ 
(1740/2000: 2.3.3.4, 226), while also complaining that too often in philosophy ‘it is not reason, 
which carries the prize, but eloquence’ (1740/2000: Intro.2, 3). 
 
At the conclusion of the Treatise, however, Hume makes clear that ‘were it proper in such a 
subject to bribe the reader’s assent, or employ anything but solid argument’, his seemingly dry 
anatomy of the moral sentiments is in fact ‘abundantly supplied with topics to engage the 
affections’ (1740/2000: 3.3.6.3, 394). In his later writings, Hume lost this reticence about 
engaging readers’ affects, and used a wide variety of literary techniques in the attempt to do so 
(Frazer 2015).  
 
Hume came to see that, if his readers fail to feel affective approbation for the moral sentiments 
that he is analyzing, his normative defence of these sentiments becomes merely descriptive. 
Since all evaluation contains an affective component, sentimentalist theory cannot be 
consistently normative without being impassioned. While there is no necessary connection 
between sentimentalism as such and the practice of impassioned theorizing, the conjunction of 
sentimentalism with a commitment to practising normative evaluation does require emotion.  
 
If sentimentalists abide by the standard methods of analytic philosophy, they will only evoke 
affective approbation and disapprobation unintentionally, if at all. Their work may end up merely 
descriptive. Even worse, it might weaken our moral sentiments. Hume is deeply concerned that 
any moral sentiment can ‘with facility, be refined away … in sifting and scrutinizing it, by every 
captious rule of logic, in every light or position, in which it may be placed’ (Hume 1985: 482). 
To be sure, Hume holds that those who tamp down their moral sentiments in this way are 
indulging in a ‘false philosophy’, but even accurate philosophy may have similar results.  
 
Although the minute moral distinctions that casuists draw are often unobjectionable when 
considered individually, the very process of coldly drawing distinction after distinction seems to 
desensitize both casuists and their audience to the properly affective features of moral life. 
Anyone who has ever sat through a dispassionate—or even downright cheerful—discussion by 
analytic ethicists of scenarios involving running over people with trolleys and resorting to 
cannibalism on lifeboats has to worry that standard analytic methods can have precisely this 
effect. Nor is this problem a new one: Seneca also objected to the logic-chopping playfulness of 
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the ethicists of his own day. ‘It makes one ashamed’, he writes, ‘that men of our advanced years 
should turn a thing as serious as this into a game’ (Seneca 2004: 97). 
 
 
3. Objections to Impassioned Philosophy 
Before we can discuss practical techniques for successfully evoking moral sentiments in our 
readers, we have to address the argument that this is not an appropriate goal to be pursuing in the 
first place. I will focus on two important objections to the practice of impassioned philosophy:  
the objection from disciplinary distinctions, and the objection against manipulation. 
 
3.1. The Objection from Disciplinary Distinctions 
There is a remarkable degree of methodological conservatism in most academic disciplines. The 
most common criticism of anyone violating local conventions is that their work is not ‘real’: not 
‘real philosophy’, ‘real political theory’, and so on. If research resembles work done outside the 
academy rather than in an adjacent discipline, it may not even qualify as ‘real scholarship’. 
While the professional norms of each discipline may seem self-justifying to most of their 
practitioners, Applebaum (2000) observes that what creates an ethical justification for abiding by 
the duties of a particular profession is the importance of that profession for one’s larger society. 
If a particular vocation serves no justifiable purpose, then the internal rules of that profession are 
not a legitimate branch of any larger ethical system. We’re all better off without professional 
gladiators and professional torturers. The question is therefore whether the reigning standards of 
a given profession—such as the methodological norms of an academic discipline—aid in the 
achievement of a genuinely valuable social purpose.  
The methodological standards governing analytic philosophy are less than a century old. The 
idea of a philosophy as a distinct discipline is slightly older. In the eighteenth century and earlier, 
philosophy was simply the search for general, nomothetic truth. As such, it included much of 
what we now call ‘science’, but still excluded activities that have something other than general 
truth as their aim—such as persuasive oratory and idiographic narrative, whether factual or 
fictional. 
The principle that the search for general truth precludes the evocation of emotion has long had its 
defenders. Recall the young Hume’s view that when discussing ‘such a subject’ it is 
inappropriate to ‘employ anything but solid argument’.  
Later, Smith contrasts three types of writing: narrative, didactic and rhetorical. Didactic 
discourse, of which philosophical writing is the paradigm, ‘proposes to put before us the 
arguments on both sides of the question in their true light, giving each its proper degree of 
influence, and has it in view to persuade no farther than the arguments themselves appear 
convincing’. By contrast, rhetorical discourse ‘endeavors by all means to persuade us, and for 
this purpose it magnifies the arguments on the one side and diminishes or conceals that might be 
brought’ on the other. The goal of a didactic discourse is primarily instruction, and only 
secondarily persuasion; the goal of rhetoric is persuasion and ‘instruction is considered only so 
far as it is subservient to persuasion, and no farther’ (Smith 1985: 12, i.149-150, p. 62). 
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Although the line between rhetorical and didactic compositions is sharply drawn, the line 
between didactic and narrative writing is blurrier. This is most evident in the genre of history, a 
form of narrative writing that incorporates significant didactic elements. The didactic power of 
historical and other factual narratives, moreover, suggests a sort of hybrid genre in which an 
author establishes ‘certain principles’ that are ‘confirmed by examples’ (Smith 1985: 17 ii.17, 
pp. 90-1). This hybrid approach is particularly well-suited for what Smith calls ‘the practical 
sciences of politics and morality or ethics’, which he complains ‘have of late been treated too 
much in a speculative manner’ (Smith 1985: i.102, p. 41). 
If ethics and politics are treated too speculatively—that is, only in terms of nomothetic principles 
rather than in terms of concrete events in the lives of particular human beings—our moral 
sentiments may be blocked. ‘When a philosopher contemplates characters and manners in his 
closet’, Hume complains, ‘the general abstract view of the objects leaves the mind so cold and 
unmoved, that the sentiments of nature have no room to play, and he scarce feels the difference 
between vice and virtue’. A historian, by contrast, ‘places the objects in their true point of view’, 
and hence develops ‘a lively sentiment of blame and praise’ (Hume 1985: 568).  In all of his 
post-Treatise writings, Hume is therefore careful to illustrate every moral and political point with 
concrete examples. Hume usually takes his examples from history and the classics; Smith tends 
to prefer everyday experiences that his readers will recognize from their own lives. 
Interdisciplinarity has thus been a hallmark of moral sentimentalism from its beginning (Frazer 
2016). Moral sentiments are unlikely to be evoked effectively when one strictly follows the 
norms of didactic, speculative eighteenth-century philosophy, let alone the norms of analytic 
philosophy in the twenty-first century. As such, sentimentalists can make common cause with 
those practising what is now called realist or non-ideal theory, overcoming the barriers between 
political philosophy and social science (see Jubb’s chapter in this volume).  
Much of the empirical work cited by realists today is the sort of nomothetic social science that 
still qualifies as philosophy in the eighteenth-century sense, the kind of ‘general facts about 
human society’ that Rawls allows to the otherwise ignorant agents in the original position (Rawls 
1999: 116). In order to integrate narrative and didactic elements in the manner advocated by 
Hume and Smith, sentimentalists are more likely to draw on idiographic work in history and 
ethnography. They are particularly likely to be drawn to the work of social scientists who favour 
interpretive rather than causal explanations of human behavior. In the interpretive tradition, 
tracing others’ narratives allow us to identify their motivations, values and worldviews, hence 
achieving empathetic understanding, what Weber (1978, 7-8) calls Verstehen. Although Weber 
believed that Verstehen is compatible with a commitment to value-neutrality, sentimentalists 
seek such empathetic understanding insofar as it allows for accurate, affectively-laden normative 
judgments. 
There is a growing awareness in the social sciences that accurate accounts of particular incidents 
can serve as what Thacher (2006) calls ‘normative case studies’. A ‘phronetic’ social science of 
the sort advocated by Flyvbjerg (2001) considers such cases in order to help us develop the skills 
of ethical judgment required to guide public decision-making for the better. It is a friendly 
amendment to this agenda to understand the ethical skills being developed to consist largely in 
emotional, empathetic sensitivity.  
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In addition to joining forces with those seeking to challenge the division between normative 
theory and social science, sentimentalists may also ally themselves with those opposed to the 
division between philosophy and the rest of the humanities—especially the movement that Danto 
(1985: 63) calls ‘philosophy as/and/of literature.’ To be sure, turning from factual to fictional 
narratives poses the danger that fictions will be designed manipulatively, artificially evoking 
inappropriate moral sentiments. While the particular challenges that a sentimentalist faces when 
drawing on imaginative literature will be discussed later in this chapter, this worry suggests a 
second objection to the sentimentalist approach. Even if it is acceptable to challenge reigning 
disciplinary distinctions, one might still worry that it is unacceptable to evoke moral sentiments 
in one’s readers because doing so is manipulative. 
 
3.2. The Objection Against Manipulation 
Recall Hume’s contention that evoking moral sentiments is an attempt to ‘bribe the reader’s 
assent’ (section 2, above). On this view, evoking a reader’s sentiments might itself be ethically 
objectionable—a deformation of the appropriate relationship between an author and a reader, just 
as bribery is a deformation of the proper relationship between a citizen and an official. This 
moral objection holds regardless of an author’s disciplinary identity, or lack thereof. 
 
Bentham was later to sharpen the point still further, arguing that what Hume said was merely 
bribery is in fact ‘a cloak, and pretense, and alignment, to despotism’. Emotionally evocative 
literary effects are but ‘so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any 
external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author’s sentiment or 
opinion as a reason for itself’ (Bentham 1789/1962: 2:14, 8-9). 
 
Bentham foreshadows the hostility to evoking emotion which we find in the more recent liberal 
theories. Darwall (1995: 74) interprets Bentham as regarding an obligation to provide public 
justification ‘as a necessary condition of liberal public moral debate. When people make a moral 
claim on others, he suggests, but are unwilling to offer a reason for doing so that others could be 
expected to accept without already sharing those moral views, this is implicitly coercive.’ The 
contrast here is between the power of an authoritarian demagogue—for whom emotionally 
manipulative propaganda is just another means of control, no different in this respect from the 
secret police—and the non-coercive exchange of reasons among equals in democratic discourse. 
 
There is, however, a regrettable slippage in this argument between the idea that public 
justification requires the provision of public reasons (in the sense of grounds for justification 
which you expect the entire community to share) and that it requires reasoning (in the sense of 
collective reliance on the rational faculty alone). As recent sentimentalist political theorists have 
pointed out, an important implication of moral sentimentalism is that our reasons—whether 
individual and private or public and shared—cannot come from reason alone (Krause 2008; 
Frazer 2010; Kingston 2011). Shared reasons imply the existence of shared feelings; this is why 
sympathy or empathy, the faculties by which emotions are communicated from one person to 
another, are so important in most versions of sentimentalism (but see Prinz 2011). It is no more 
despotic, coercive or manipulative for members of a political community to share emotions with 
one another than it is for them to provide rational arguments to one another.  
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Recent philosophers have struggled to provide a precise account of what constitutes 
manipulation, but there is a general consensus that evoking emotion is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for manipulation to occur. Most see manipulation as influence that is at best indifferent 
to whether its target adheres to the relevant standards of good judgment (Coons and Weber 2014: 
11-14). This raises the question of whether these relevant standards are objectively binding or are 
grounded in the subjective commitments of the manipulator, the target, or both. Regardless, if all 
the parties involved are committed sentimentalists—and if they are objectively correct to in 
being so—then the ideals in question will call for the feeling of proper emotions. This is not to 
say that morally unacceptable forms of interpersonal manipulation are impossible among 
sentimentalists, but that they are just as likely to involve sophistic argumentation as they are to 
involve the artificial evocation of affect.  
 
 
4. Techniques for Impassioned Philosophy 
Simply establishing that it is permissible to evoke moral sentiments in our readers would be of 
little value were it impossible for us ever do so successfully. Fortunately, this sentimentalist goal 
is eminently achievable. Admittedly, evoking emotion is an art rather than a science, and using 
the techniques described below is neither necessary nor sufficient for impassioned philosophy. It 
is not necessary because, as has already been mentioned, analytic philosophers often end up 
evoking moral sentiments without even intending to do so. It is not sufficient because, if not 
practised with the right degree of philosophical and literary artistry, these techniques cannot be 
guaranteed to succeed. 
 
4.1. Write Interesting Stories 
As is now already evident, the best format for impassioned, sentimentalist normative theory is a 
genre combining both idiographic and nomothetic elements, both particular narratives and 
general philosophy. The most important thing sentimentalists should keep in mind when writing 
a story is that it should be interesting, both in the sense that we use the term ‘interesting’ today 
and in its original meaning, still dominant in the eighteenth century, of involving or engaging our 
interests.  
The antiquated and the current uses of ‘interesting’ are closely connected. As Vermeule (2010: 
41) observes, engaging our empathy with another human mind is a sure-fire way to hold our 
attention. Sentimentalist theory should be filled with interesting stories, ones in which we 
sympathetically engage with the characters, allowing their needs and interests to become 
our own. Without this engagement with another’s interests, we are likely to find ourselves left 
both cold and bored. 
Livy, for example, interests us because ‘we enter into all the concerns of the parties and are 
almost as much affected with them as if we ourselves had been concerned in them’ (Smith 1985: 
17, ii.27, 95-96). Via sympathy, their interests become our own. Livy and Tacitus lead us ‘so far 
into the sentiments and mind of the actors that they are some of the most striking and interesting 
passages to be met with in any history’ (Smith 1985: 20, ii.67, 113).  
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Well-written history is always interesting in this way, as are philosophical, didactic writings that 
make frequent use of well-written narratives. This is probably one of the reasons why historians 
and ethnographers still regularly find an audience among the educated reading public, while 
philosophers who are not also storytellers rarely do so. 
 
4.2 Show, Don’t Tell 
Manipulative rhetoricians often succeed in arousing moral sentiments in their audiences, but they 
do so in ways very different from those writing in the mode that Hume and Smith advocate. The 
author of a well-written historical narrative, Smith points out, ‘may excite grief or compassion 
but only by narrating facts which excite those feelings; whereas the orator heightens every 
incident and pretends at least to be deeply affected by them himself’ (Smith 1985: 18, ii.38, 101). 
A good historian ‘acts as if he were an impartial narrator of the facts’ (Smith 1985: 7, i.82-83, 
35), and ‘exclamations in his own person would not suit with the impartiality he is to maintain 
and the design he is to have in view of narrating facts as they are without magnifying or 
diminishing them’ (Ibid., 18, ii.40, 101).  
The best writers in other genres, including the hybrid genre which is most appropriate for 
sentimentalist political theory, typically share the historian’s characteristic ‘modesty’ in this 
regard. When detailing their narratives, sentimentalists should refrain from telling their 
readers how to feel, letting their stories speak for themselves.   
Smith and Hume were both, like many of their time, admirers of the essayist Joseph Addison. 
While previous print moralists would harangue their readers with moral exhortation, following 
the model of the church sermon, Addison prefers to ‘deliver his sentiments in the least assuming 
manner; and this would incline him rather to narrate what he had seen and heard than to deliver 
his opinions in his own person’ (Smith 1985: 10, i.128, 53). Addison’s authorial persona, like 
Smith’s ideal moral judge, is an impartial spectator—‘Mr. Spectator’, as Addison calls him—
who simply tells it like he sees it. The immense popularity and influence of Addison’s Spectator 
is evidence of the popular power of such non-rhetorical writing.   
It is a striking fact of human psychology that this more modest approach can arouse even greater 
emotional reactions than those aroused by direct rhetorical appeals. Smith argues that it is a 
‘general rule that when we mean to affect the reader deeply we must have recourse to the indirect 
method of description, relating the effects the transaction produced both on the actors and the 
spectators’ (Smith 1985: 16, ii.7, 86-87). Creative writers are taught the rule ‘show, don’t tell’, 
not to establish impartiality or avoid manipulation, but simply to maximize emotional impact. 
The fact that the same technique is the best way to achieve these two very different objectives is 
a happy coincidence of human psychology.  
 
4.3. Focus on Particulars, Then Generalize 
While analytic theorists often try to deduce particular conclusions from general moral principles, 
Smith insists that the general rules of morality should only be derived inductively. Specifically, 
they are to be ‘formed, by finding from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or 
circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of’ (Smith, 1759/1790/1984: 
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III.4.8, 159). Sentimentalists should begin with empathetic consideration of particulars, 
only then attempting to extrapolate from these cases to more general principles, rather 
than vice versa. When a general principle is stated in the abstract, we are unlikely to have any 
emotional reaction. When, however, it is inductively derived from a series of cases, each one of 
which evoked our moral sentiments, it can carry with it the force of the cases that serve as its 
foundation.    
Even within a particular normative case study, the reader’s attention is best focused on the 
subjective experiences of particular individuals. Smith says Tacitus is a particularly good 
example of an author who focuses on ‘internal’ micro-level phenomena rather than ‘external’, 
macro-level ones. When Tacitus fixes our attention on the psyche of a single individual, our 
sympathies are ‘as it were concentrated, and become greatly stronger than when separated and 
distracted by the affecting circumstances that befell the several persons involved in a common 
calamity’ (Smith 1985: 20, ii.66, 113).  
Once we understand the individual experience of a certain event, we can then generalize to the 
effects of that event on relevantly similar others. It is then the empathetic understanding of 
particular experiences that allows us to inductively derive general principles about similar cases 
from the full range of human life.  
It is also the empathetic understanding that each person in a statistic represents an entire 
subjective world of experience that can prevent large numbers from having their usual morally 
distorting effects. Bertrand Russell is alleged to have said that ‘the mark of a civilized man is the 
capacity to read a column of numbers and weep’, but as Vermeule (2010: 33) observes, ‘on this 
view, none of us is really civilized.’ After we have empathetically experienced the suffering of a 
single individual, however, learning that a troublingly large number of others have experienced 
something similar can have a profound emotional effect. When we are discussing global poverty, 
for example, we must never forget that we are discussing the lives of millions of real human 
beings, each of which could be recounted with the novelistic detail of the stories in Boo’s (2012) 
account of a single Mumbai slum. 
Guenther’s (2013) phenomenological study of solitary confinement is a good model for how to 
combine Boo’s focus on individual experiences with the pursuit of general philosophical 
conclusions. Guenther helps us understand that the experience of years of forced isolation is the 
phenomenological equivalent of death. Cut-off from all others, a prisoner ceases to have the 
inescapably social experiences that are the markers of living humanity. When we empathetically 
feel the horror of such living death, we understand the cruelty of subjecting even a single 
individual to it. We can then extrapolate to the full moral significance of subjecting thousands 
upon thousands of prisoners to such an experience throughout a nation’s penal system. We are 
then also able to begin establishing normative principles about the importance of social 
interaction to human life more generally.   
 
4.4. Consider Multiple Perspectives 
Whenever we seek to generalize from the subjective experience of a single individual, there is a 
danger that our generalization will fail to capture the experiences of others. If our chosen 
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individual is not typical, then our generalization may prove misleading. Although we lack the 
imaginative and emotional resources to engage empathetically with a statistically representative 
sample of any large population, we can make a concerted effort to find counter-examples to any 
general theses, and then give the individuals involved in these counter-cases our full empathetic 
consideration. If the most likely potential counter-examples turn out to have experiences 
relevantly similar to those we have already considered, this provides important evidence in 
favour of our general hypothesis. Those wishing to question our generalization are always free to 
suggest other potential counter-examples. 
In many politically important cases, however, generalizations that hold true about the subjective 
experiences of all individuals involved are neither possible nor desirable. Politics typically 
involves conflict between competing interests and worldviews. When groups with radically 
different experiences of a given situation are in conflict with each other, it is appropriate to 
consider the perspectives of representative members of each of the conflicting groups. The 
ideal moral judge, Smith famously argues, is an impartial spectator; in cases where we are 
naturally biased in favor of one party in a conflict, our moral sentiments will be improved if we 
try to overcome our initial partiality. 
Smith argues that, when observing a conflict, an impartial spectator must attempt to achieve what 
he calls ‘divided sympathy’ (Smith 1759/1790/1984: I.ii.3.1, 34). We have to consider the 
experiences of those on both sides of the conflict empathetically, and try to form sensitive 
evaluations of each of them in turn. Doing so cannot involve a single narrative with a single 
protagonist, but multiple, Rashomon-style narratives of a given case in which the perspective of 
each party is given due consideration.  
Academics tend to come from the political left (Gross 2013), and typically have an inclination to 
side with those whom they see as oppressed. But Smith warns us against this instinct, and urges 
us to consider the perspective of both the alleged victim and the alleged oppressor in any 
potential case of injustice. What our initial reaction tells us is cruel or unjust may, with greater 
empathetic consideration of all the parties involved, turn out to have been motivated by laudable 
moral sentiments, such as a commitment to the common good (Smith 1759/1790/1984: II.ii.3.8, 
88-9). Neither the perspective of the powerful nor that of the powerless should be privileged. We 
may ultimately conclude that some current practice—modern policing, for example—is indeed 
oppressive, but doing so impartially requires that we consider the point of view of the police (as 
in Fassin 2013) as well as the policed (as in Goffman 2014). 
 
4.5. Use Psychologically Realistic Fiction 
Sentimentalist normative argumentation requires piling narrative upon narrative, but narratives 
are an expensive resource. All consideration of narratives is emotionally and imaginatively 
draining—especially when contrasted with the ease with which a clever undergraduate can 
construct sound and valid arguments. Any adequate narrative will demand more space than is 
typically possible in a journal article. And some kinds of narrative are also expensive to source, 
requiring years of ethnographic fieldwork or archival exploration. This raises the question of 
whether the narratives that sentimentalists use must be drawn from the careful, fact-checked 
work of historians, ethnographers and journalists, or can they just be made up—whether by 
theorists themselves or by professional writers of fiction? 
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Hume himself took a clear stand against creative writing. While poets ‘can paint virtue in the 
most charming colours’, their undisciplined imaginations often lead them to ‘become advocates 
for vice.’ By contrast, ‘historians have been, almost without exception, the true friends of virtue, 
and have always represented it in its proper colours’ (Hume 1985: 567). While it would be 
wrong to conclude that historians, ethnographers and journalists have never been guilty of 
emotionally manipulating their readers through the use of one-sided, unrealistic or even wholly 
fabricated narratives, when they have done so they have been violating the norms of their 
respective professions. Creative writers are not held accountable to reality in this way. 
Those defending fiction under the rubric of ‘philosophy as/and/of literature’ find their inspiration 
in Aristotle, who maintains that ‘poetry is more philosophical and more elevated [that is, of 
greater ethical import] than history, since poetry relates more of the universal, while history 
relates particulars’. While history recounts ‘actual events’, poetry recounts ‘the kinds of things 
that might occur … the kinds of things which it suits a certain kind of person to say or do, in 
terms of probability or necessity’ (Aristotle 1995: 1451b, 59-61). Sentimentalists are likely to 
value fiction most highly in terms of its ability to trace what Nussbaum (1995: 5) calls ‘the effect 
of circumstances on the emotions and the inner world’ and its unparalleled efficacy in promoting 
‘identification and sympathy in the reader’. 
Just as fiction can describe ‘the kinds of things that might occur’, however, it can also describe 
the kinds of things that could never occur. Fiction need not be realistic in all its details to be 
useful to sentimentalists, but if it is to show us anything real about the moral sentiments 
then characters’ inner worlds must be realistic, even if the outer worlds that surround 
them are not. It is fine to fill a fictional case with dragons, spaceships, experience machines, and 
baroque trolley systems, as long as we can empathize with the three-dimensional characters 
trying to navigate these bizarre circumstances. In order not to distort our moral sentiments, 
however, writers must avoid flat characters like demonic villains and angelic heroes. The 
presence of such impossible people is a warning sign that readers are being manipulated. 
The problem here is that, while it is always possible to check the accuracy of a factual narrative, 
there is no objective test for the psychological realism of a fictional narrative. All we can rely on 
is our own power to recognize and empathize with what we appreciate to be plausibly human 
states of mind. For example, it seems psychologically realistic to most readers that the 
protagonist of Thomson’s (1971) famous thought experiment about abortion would deeply resent 
being attached to an ailing violinist for nine months. Since no one has actually experienced this 
particular procedure, however, there is no way to check how it actually makes someone feel. 
With their preference for high culture over low, academics tend to assume that great literature is 
more likely to be psychologically realistic than popular fiction or their own amateur storytelling. 
Philosophers have a particular liking for recent, philosophically-informed high fiction, such as 
the works of Milan Kundera, J. M. Coetzee, and David Foster Wallace. Nineteenth-century 
novels are also popular, from those by Jane Austen at the beginning of the century to those by 
Henry James at the end (the latter no doubt a favourite, at least in part, thanks to the reflected 
philosophical prestige from brother William).  
All of these are wonderful sources for narratives, to be sure, but literary genius is by no means 
necessary for the purpose of sentimentalist normative argumentation. Smith’s own homely 
stories throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments—think, for example, of the unfortunate tale 
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of the poor man’s son (Smith, 1759/1790/1984: IV.i.8, 181)—are all highly realistic examples of 
the kinds of effects that circumstances can have on our inner life, but none rise to the level of 
great literature. Thomson’s is a more recent example of a successful philosopher-written 
narrative, as is Williams’s (1981: 18) more realistic story of the spouse-rescuer with ‘one thought 
too many.’ While it is important not to underestimate the literary gifts of Smith, Williams, or 
Thomson, theorists without the creative genius of Kundera or James might nonetheless hope to 
craft serviceable fictions of this caliber.  
 
4.6. Write in Simple, Ordinary Language  
Good writers, in any genre, share sentiments with their readers. Indeed, the central thesis of 
Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres is that ‘when the sentiment of the speaker is 
expressed in a neat, clear, plain and clever manner, and the passion or affection he is possessed 
of and intends, by sympathy, to communicate to his hearer is plainly and cleverly hit off, then 
and then only the expression has all the force and beauty that language can give it’ (Smith 1985: 
6, i.v.56, 25). The Lectures is by and large a how-to guide designed to help Smith’s students 
achieve this goal. Sentimentalists today would still be well-advised to follow his stylistic 
suggestions. 
A recurring theme in Smith’s lectures is the contrast between the straightforward lucidity of 
Jonathan Swift and the opaque floridity of the third Earl of Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury, Smith 
explains, fell prey to a mistake to which we are all vulnerable. ‘The idea we form of a good style 
is almost contrary to that which we commonly hear’, Smith explains. ‘Hence it is that we 
conceive the further one’s style is removed from the common manner … it is so much the nearer 
to the purity and perfection we have in view’ (Smith 1985: 8, i.103, 42). This belief is, of course, 
mistaken. In order to evoke sentiments in their readers effectively, writers should use a style 
of prose continuous with the ordinary language that is the normal vehicle of emotional 
communication in everyday life. 
Academics today would never be attracted to the aristocratic excesses of Shaftesbury’s 
antiquated mode of writing. Instead of aping the baroque floridity of aristocratic oratory, most 
philosophers now seek to gain prestige by aping the dry, technical style that predominates in 
high-status STEM fields. Yet there are a number of ways in which these seemingly opposed 
modes of artificial communication are surprisingly similar. For example, the tempo of normal 
speech varies considerably with the matter being discussed, but both artificial modes maintain a 
constant rhythm even when ‘this uniform and regular cadence is not at all proper’ (Smith 1985: 
5, i.50, 22). Both artificial modes make everyone sound the same, whereas in natural 
communication ‘when all other circumstances are alike the character of the author must make the 
style different’ (Smith 1985: 8, i.97, 40). The list could be continued; in each case, artificial 
styles prevent emotional reactions in readers while everyday language encourages them. 
Perhaps the most common way of distinguishing artificial modes of communication from 
ordinary speech is through the use of foreign terms. Greek or Latin words and phrases—and, 
even worse, Latin grammatical structures—lend an unearned air of authority to English prose, 
but at the price of turning it into something that is not quite English. Bad writing, both in Smith’s 
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day and our own, often has ‘a great deal of the air of translations from another language’ (Smith 
1985: 2, i.10, 7). 
Smith argues that the words we use ‘should be natives … of the language we speak in’. As 
always, this rule is justified in terms of the best means of evoking sentiments in our readers. 
‘Foreigners’, Smith explains, ‘though they may signify the same thing, never convey the idea 
with such strength as those [words that] we are acquainted with’ (Smith 1985: 2, i.1, 3). Just 
think of the effects of choosing a word like ‘ressentiment’ over ‘resentment’. The gain in prestige 
is hardly worth the loss of evocative force. To be sure, Smith admits that foreign words ‘may be 
naturalized by time and be as familiar to us as those which are originally our own, and may then 
be used with great freedom’ (Smith 1985: 2, i.1, 3). Only then can these words connect with 
everyday life and the speech found within it, and hence carry the emotional force of these 
associations with lived experience.  
If a neologism is needed, it should be constructed from one or more terms found in everyday 
English. Smith praises Greek philosophers for using only words found in their own language 
even when coining new terms of art (Smith 1985: 2, i.4, 4). In later centuries, German authors 
made use of a similar practice. Contrast Freud’s das Es, das Ich, and das Über-Ich to his English 
translator’s id, ego and superego. 
The effect of all of these recommendations will be to narrow the gulf between political theory 
and all other forms of discourse, both elite and popular. This loss of disciplinary distinctiveness, 
however, is to be celebrated rather than mourned. For one thing, it is likely to increase the 
‘impact’ of political theory outside the academy. Lay readers are happy to learn from academics, 
but only if these academics are willing to speak in the interesting, unavoidably impassioned 
language of normal human life. To be sure, public intellectuals are often excoriated for failing to 
produce ‘real scholarship’, but we have already seen that this accusation should carry no ethical 
weight.  
‘Be a philosopher’, Hume famously urges us, ‘but amidst all your philosophy be still a man’ 
(Hume 1748/1776/2000: 1.6, 7). Since academics must, unavoidably, remain human beings, we 
should not be ashamed that the same sort of impassioned argumentation that is persuasive among 
the general population is also the best form of argumentation available to us. 
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